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Abstract
Asymmetric information is an important phenomenon in many markets and in particular in
insurance markets. Testing for asymmetric information has become a very important issue in
the literature in the last two decades. Almost all testing procedures that are used in empirical
studies are parametric, which may yield misleading conclusions in the case of misspecification
of either functional or distributional relationships among the variables of interest. Motivated
by the literature on testing conditional independence, we propose a new nonparametric test
for asymmetric information which is applicable in a variety of situations. We demonstrate the
test works reasonably well through Monte Carlo simulations and apply it to an automobile
insurance data set. Our empirical results consolidate Chiappori and Salanié’s (2000) findings
that there is no evidence for the presence of asymmetric information in the French automobile
insurance market.
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1 Introduction
Since Akerlof (1970) the notion of asymmetric information, comprising adverse selection and
moral hazard, has been explored at a rapid pace. At the same time people observed a wide
gap between the theoretical development and empirical studies in asymmetric information.
This gap has recently become narrower. In particular, the insurance market has been a
fruitful and productive field for empirical studies. There are two reasons for this. First,
insurance contracts are usually highly standardized and can exhaustively be described by a
relatively small set of variables, and insurees’ performances, i.e., the occurrence of a claim
and possibly its cost, are exactly filed in the database of a insurance company. Second,
insurance companies have hundreds of thousands or even millions of clients and therefore the
samples are suﬃciently large for econometric studies. Hence, fields like automobile insurance,
annuities and life insurance, crops insurance, long-term care and health insurance oﬀer a large
sample of standardized contracts for which performances are recorded and therefore are well
suited for testing the theoretical predictions of contract theory. For a detailed justification for
using insurance data to test contract theory, see Chiappori and Salanié (1997). For a recent
overview over the issue of testing for adverse selection in insurance markets, see Cohen and
Siegelman (2010). The latter paper covers a large number of empirical studies in diﬀerent
insurance branches.
In statistical terms, the theoretical notion of asymmetric information implies a positive
(conditional) correlation between coverage and risk. In their seminal paper Chiappori and
Salanié (2000) propose both parametric and nonparametric methods to test this. Their non-
parametric tests are restricted to discrete data with only two categories per variable even
though some of the variables in the data set are continuous and others have far more than
two categories. Therefore, in order to conduct Chiappori and Salanié’s nonparametric test, all
variables must be transformed to binary variables, which often results in a loss of information.
The implication of such transformation has not been clear to us yet. Following the lead of
Chiappori and Salanié (2000), most subsequent studies use a variation of their parametric
testing procedure which has become somewhat standard in the empirical contract theory.
Nevertheless, these parametric tests are fragile to both functional and distributional form
misspecifications which are a severe problem in this field. For example, in the automobile
insurance market it is common knowledge that the age of the driver has a nonlinear eﬀect on
the probability of an accident, but such a nonlinear eﬀect has rarely been taken into account
in the literature. For another example, the error term in the binary model for modeling the
choice of an insurance contract may not be either normally or logistically distributed, and tests
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for asymmetric information based on the probit or logit model can therefore yield misleading
conclusions in the case of incorrect distributional specification. For this reason, in this paper
we propose a new purely nonparametric test for asymmetric information based on the notion
of conditional independence, which avoids the problem of either functional or distributional
misspecification.
The absence of asymmetric information means that the choice of a contract Y (discrete
variable) provides no information for predicting the “performance” variable Z (discrete or
continuous, e.g., the number of claims or the sum of reimbursements), conditional on the
vector X of all exogenous variables (discrete and continuous). Therefore we can transform
the problem of testing the absence of asymmetric information into a test for conditional
independence: F (Z|X,Y ) = F (Z|X) almost surely (a.s.) where, e.g., F (Z|X,Y ) denotes
the conditional cumulative distribution function (CDF) of Z given (X,Y ) . We propose a
nonparametric test statistic to test the conditional independence of Z and Y given X. We
show that the test statistic is asymptotic normally distributed under the null hypothesis of
conditional independence (or absence of asymmetric information) and diverges to infinity in
the presence of conditional dependence (or asymmetric information). We then apply our test
to a French automobile insurance data set and compare our testing results with the results
found in the literature.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the theory of asymmetric
information. Section 3 reviews the standard statistical tools for testing asymmetric inform-
ation. We introduce a new nonparametric test for conditional independence in Section 4.
We conduct a small set of Monte Carlo simulations to examine the performance of the new
test in Section 5. We apply our test to test for the asymmetric information in the French
insurance market in Section 6. Final remarks are contained in Section 7. All technical details
are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Theory of Asymmetric Information
In their seminal paper Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) introduce the notion of adverse selec-
tion in insurance markets that has since then been extended in many directions.1 In the
basic model, the insureds have private information about the expected claim, exactly speak-
ing about the probability that a claim with fixed level occurs, while the insurers do not have
this information. Thus there are two groups with diﬀerent claim probabilities, the “bad” and
1For a detailed survey on adverse selection and the related moral hazard problem, see Dionne, Doherty and
Fombaron (2000) and Winter (2000), respectively.
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“good” risks. The agents have identical preferences which are moreover perfectly known to
the insurer. Additionally, perfect competition and exclusive contracts are assumed. Exclusive
contracts mean that an insuree can buy coverage only from one insurance company. This al-
lows firms to implement nonlinear (especially convex) pricing schemes which are typical under
asymmetric information. Under this setting insurance companies oﬀer a menu of contracts in
equilibrium: a full insurance which is chosen by the “bad” risks and a partial coverage which
is bought by the “good” risks. In general, contracts with more comprehensive coverage are
sold at a higher (unitary) premium.
Clearly, one expects a positive correlation between “risk” and “coverage” (conditional on
observables). Since the assumptions in the Rothschild and Stiglitz model are very simplistic
and normally not fulfilled in real applications, an important question to address is how robust
this coverage-risk correlation is. Chiappori et al. (2006) show that the positive correlation
property extends to much more general models, as already conjectured by Chiappori and
Salanié (2000). Under competitive markets this property is also valid in a very general frame-
work entailing heterogeneous preferences, multiple level of losses, multidimensional adverse
selection plus possible moral hazard and even non-expected utility theory. In the case of
imperfect competition some form of positive correlation must hold if the agent’s risk aver-
sion becomes public information. In the case of private information the property does not
necessarily hold (c.f. Jullien et al. (2007)).
While adverse selection concerns “hidden information”, moral hazard deals with “hidden
action”. Moral hazard occurs when the expected loss (accident probability or level of damage)
is not exogenous, as assumed in the adverse selection case, but depends on some decision or
action made by the subscriber (e.g., eﬀort or prevention) which is neither observable nor
contractible. A higher coverage leads to decreased eﬀorts and therefore to a higher expected
loss. Therefore moral hazard also predicts a positive correlation between “coverage” and
“risk”.
Although both phenomena lead to a positive risk-coverage correlation, there is one im-
portant diﬀerence: under adverse selection the risk of the potential insuree aﬀects the choice
of the contract, whereas under moral hazard the chosen contract influences the behavior and
therefore the expected loss. So there exists reversed causality in both cases.2
In sum, the theory of asymmetric information3 predicts a positive correlation between
2To disentangle moral hazard from adverse selection is an important problem in the empirical literature.
The first attempt is Dionne et. al. (2004). An overview over diﬀerent possible strategies for dealing with this
problem can be found in Cohen and Siegelman (2010).
3 It seems that in the empirical insurance literature adverse selection is more stressed than the moral hazard
aspect which only receives minor attention, see, e.g., Cohen and Siegelman (2010).
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(appropriately defined) “risk” and “coverage” which should be quite robust.
To proceed, it is worth mentioning that to test for asymmetric information, the researcher
needs to access to the same information which is also available to the insurer and used for
pricing. The theory of adverse selection predicts that the insurance company oﬀers a menu
of contracts to indistinguishable individuals. Individuals are (ex ante) indistinguishable for
the insurer if they share the same characteristics. Therefore the positive risk-coverage correl-
ation is valid only conditional on the observed characteristics. Diﬀerent groups of observable
equivalent individuals are oﬀered diﬀerent menus of contracts with diﬀerent prices according
to their risk exposure.4 Only within each class are the mechanisms described above valid.
3 Standard Testing Procedures
In this section we review some tests of asymmetric information in the literature. We first out-
line the general structure of the problem, and then review the parametric and nonparametric
testing procedures in turn.
3.1 General Structure
In the following we denote by X the vector of exogenous control variables to be conditional
on, by Y a decision or choice variable, and by Z the endogenous “performance” variable. In
the context of insurance, X usually includes variables that are used for risk classification by
the insurance company, Y could be the choice of deductibles, and Z could be the number of
accidents or claims5 or the sum of reimbursements caused by accidents. As we shall see, we
allow both continuous and discrete variables in X, and Z can be continuous or discrete. For
concreteness, we assume that Y is a discrete variable. There is no asymmetric information if
and only if the prediction of the endogenous variable Z based on X and Y jointly coincides
with its prediction based on X alone. Formally, this can be stated in terms of the equivalence
of two conditional CDFs:
F (Z|X,Y ) = F (Z|X) a.s., (3.1)
where, e.g., F (Z|X,Y ) denotes the conditional CDF of Z given (X,Y ). Intuitively, this means
that the the choice of the contract, e.g., the choice of a certain deductible, provides no useful
information for predicting the risk, e.g., the number of claims, as soon as the risk classes are
4For the theory of risk classification under asymmetric information see Crocker and Snow (2000).
5The distinction of accidents and claims is a very important point in the empirical literature as not every
accident leads to a claim. Neglecting this issue might lead to biased results.
5
controlled for. Equivalently, we can interchange the roles of Z and Y :
F (Y |X,Z) = F (Y |X) a.s., (3.2)
where, e.g., F (Y |X,Z) denotes the conditional CDF of Y given (X,Z). (3.2) says that the
number of claims (or the sum of reimbursements caused by accidents) does not provide useful
information to predict the choice of deductibles as long as we control the risk classes. Either
(3.1) or (3.2) indicates the conditional independence of Y and Z given X.6
3.2 Parametric Testing Procedures
Almost all empirical studies analyzing the positive risk-coverage correlation property use one
of the following two types of parametric procedures.
The first approach is to run a regression of Zi on Yi and Xi and test whether the coeﬃcient
of Yi is zero or not. When Zi is continuously valued, the regression model is
Zi = β0 + β1Yi + β
0
2Xi + εi, (3.3)
where εi is the error term, β0, and
¡
β1, β
0
2
¢
are intercept and slope coeﬃcients, respectively,
and the prime denotes transpose. When Zi is a dummy variable, the regression model is
Zi = 1(β0 + β1Yi + β
0
2Xi + εi > 0) (3.4)
where εi is assumed to be either normally or logistically distributed, and 1 (A) = 1 if A is
true and 0 otherwise. If Zi is a discrete variable that has more than two categories, then one
can use the ordered logit model. One obvious drawback of this approach is that it neglects
by construction the potential nonlinear eﬀects of the controlled variables, and a test based on
(3.3) is designed to test the conditional mean independence of Zi and Yi given Xi, which is a
much weaker condition than conditional independence at the distributional level. In addition,
the distributional assumption in the probit, logit, or ordered logit model may not hold, and
once this happens, tests for asymmetric information can lead to misleading conclusions.
In one of the first empirical studies Puelz and Snow (1994) consider an ordered logit
formulation for the deductible choice variable and find strong evidence for the presence of
asymmetric information in the market for automobile collision insurance in Georgia. But
6Alternatively, one can use conditional probability density or mass functions to form the independence
between Y and Z conditional on X : f (Z|X,Y ) = f (Z|X) , or f (Y |X,Z) = f (Y |X) a.s., where e.g.,
f (Z|X,Y ) denotes the conditional probability density or mass function of Z given (X,Y ) . See Su and White
(2007, 2008, 2010) for other equivalent formulations.
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Dionne et al. (2001) show that this correlation might be spurious because of the highly
constrained form of the exogenous eﬀects or the misspecification of the functional form used
in the regression. They propose to add the estimate Eˆ(Zi|Xi) of the conditional expected
value of Zi given Xi as a regressor into the ordered logit model to take into account the
nonlinear eﬀect of the risk classification variables, and by accounting for this, they find no
residual asymmetric information in the market for Canadian automobile insurance.
A second and more advanced approach was introduced by Chiappori and Salanié (1997,
2000) and has become widespread in the empirical contract theory since then. They define
two probit models, one for the choice of the coverage Yi (either compulsory/basic coverage or
comprehensive coverage) and the other for the occurrence of an accident Zi (either no accident
being blamed for or at least one accident with fault):(
Yi = 1(β0Xi + εi > 0)
Zi = 1(γ0Xi + ηi > 0)
(3.5)
where εi and ηi are independent standard normal errors, and β and γ are coeﬃcients. They
first estimate these two probit models independently, calculate the generalized residuals εˆi
and ηˆi, 7 and then construct the following test statistic
Wn =
(
Pn
i=1 εˆiηˆi)
2Pn
i=1 εˆ
2
i ηˆ
2
i
. (3.6)
Under the null of conditional independence, cov(εi, ηi) = 0 and Wn is distributed asymptot-
ically as χ2(1). Alternatively, one can estimate a bivariate probit model in which εi and ηi
are distributed as bivariate normal with correlation coeﬃcient ρ to be estimated, and then
test whether ρ = 0 or not. They find no evidence of asymmetric information in the French
automobile insurance market.
3.3 Nonparametric Testing Procedures
Motivated by the χ2-test for independence in the statistics literature, Chiappori and Salanié
(2000) propose a nonparametric test for asymmetric information by restricting all variables
in Xi, Yi, and Zi to be binary. They choose a set of m exogenous binary variables in Xi, and
construct M ≡ 2m cells in which all individuals have the same values for all variables in Xi.
For each cell they set up a 2× 2 contingency table generated by the binary values of Yi and
7For example, the generalized residual εˆi estimates E (εi|Yi) . See Gourieroux et al. (1987) for the definition
of generalized residuals in limited dependent models.
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Zi, and conduct a χ2-test for independence. This results in M test statistics, each of which is
distributed asymptotically as χ2 (1) under the null hypothesis. They aggregate these M test
statistics in three ways to obtain three overall test statistics for conditional independence: one
is the Kolmogorov-Smirnoﬀ test statistic that compares the empirical distribution function
of the M test statistics with the CDF of the χ2 (1) distribution; the second is to count the
number of rejections for the independence test for each cell which is asymptotically distributed
as binomial B(M,α) under the null, where α denotes the significance level of the χ2 test within
each cell; and the third is the sum of all the test statistics for each individual cell, which is
asymptotically χ2(M) distributed under the null. Again, using these nonparametric methods,
they find no evidence for the presence of asymmetric information in the French automobile
insurance market.
4 A New Nonparametric Test
In this section we propose a new nonparametric test for asymmetric information based on the
formulation in (3.1). The null hypothesis is
H0 : F (Z|X,Y ) = F (Z|X) a.s., (4.1)
and the alternative hypothesis is
H1 : Pr {F (Z|X,Y ) = F (Z|X)} < 1. (4.2)
We consider the case where Y is a discrete random variable (typically dummy), Z can be
either discrete or continuous, and X contains both continuous and discrete variables. Note
that early literature on testing for conditional independence mainly focus on the case where
both Y and X are continuously distributed, see, Delgado and González-Manteiga (2001), Su
and White (2007, 2008, 2010), Song (2009), Huang (2009), Huang and White (2009), to name
just a few. Even though we restrict our attention mainly on the case where Y is discrete,
we remark that in the case of continuous Y, the proposed test continues to work with little
modification.
4.1 The Test Statistic
Given observations {(Xi, Yi, Zi)}ni=1 , one could propose a test based on the comparison of two
conditional cumulative distribution (CDF) estimates, one is the conditional CDF of Z givenX
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(F (z|x)) and the other is the conditional CDF of Z given (X,Y ) (F (z|x, y)).8 Nevertheless,
for the reason elaborated at the end of this section, we will compare F (z|x, y) with F (z|x, ey)
for diﬀerent values y and ey instead.
To allow for both continuous and discrete regressors in Xi, write Xi = (Xc
0
i ,X
d0
i )
0
where
Xci denotes a pc × 1 vector of continuous regressors in Xi and Xdi denotes a pd × 1 vector of
remaining discrete regressors with pd ≡ p − pc. For simplicity, we assume that none of the
discrete regressors has a natural ordering and each takes only a finite number of values.9 We
use Xcis (X
d
is) to denote the sth component of X
c
i (X
d
i ), where s = 1, · · · , pc (pd). We assume
that Xdis takes cs diﬀerent values in X ds ≡ {0, 1, · · · , cs − 1}, s = 1, · · · , pd, and Yi takes cy
diﬀerent values in Y ≡ {0, 1, · · · , cy − 1}.
Fix y ∈ Y. We consider the estimation of F (z|x, y) by using the local linear method. For
this purpose, we define the kernels for the continuous regressor Xci and discrete regressor X
d
i
separately. For the continuous regressor, we choose a product kernel functionQ (·) of q (·) and a
vector of smoothing parameters h ≡ (h1, ..., hpc)0. Let Qh,j (xc) ≡ Π
pc
s=1h
−1
s q
³³
Xcjs − xcs
´
/hs
´
and
Qh,ji ≡ Qh
¡
Xcj −Xci
¢
=
pcY
s=1
h−1s q
¡¡
Xcjs −Xcis
¢
/hs
¢
, (4.3)
where, for example, xc ≡ (xc1, · · · , xcpc)0, andXcis denote the sth element in Xci . For the discrete
regressor, we follow Racine and Li (2004) and Li and Racine (2007, 2008) and use a variation
of the kernel function of Aitchison and Aitken (1976):
l
³
Xdjs,X
d
is, λs
´
=
(
1 if Xdjs = X
d
is
λs otherwise
(4.4)
where λs ∈ [0, 1] is the smoothing parameter. In the special case where λs = 0, l (·, ·, ·) reduces
to the usual indicator function as used in the nonparametric frequency approach. Similarly,
λs = 1 leads to a uniform weight function, in which case, the Xdis regressor will be completely
smoothed out in the sense that it will not aﬀect the nonparametric estimation result. The
8For more rigorous notation, one could use FZ|X (z|x) (FZ|X,Y (z|x, y)) to denote the conditional CDF
of Z given X ( (X,Y )). Below we make reference to these CDFs and several probability density functions
(PDFs) simply using the list of their arguments — for example, p (x, y, z) , p (x, y) and p (x) denote the PDFs of
(Xi, Yi, Zi), (Xi, Yi), and Xi, respectively. This notation is compact, and we hope, suﬃciently unambiguous.
In addition, even though a PDF is most commonly associated with continuous distributions, here we use it
to denote the Radon—Nikodym derivative of a CDF with respect to the Lebesgue measure for the continuous
component and the counting measure for the discrete component.
9When some of the conditioning variables in Xi have a natural ordering, one can easily modify the discrete
kernel defined below following either Racine and Li (2004) or Li and Racine (2007, 2008).
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product kernel function for all the discrete vector is given by
Lλ,ji ≡ Lλ
³
Xdj ,X
d
i
´
≡
pdY
s=1
λ
1(Xdjs 6=Xdis)
s , (4.5)
where λ ≡ (λ1, · · · , λpd)0. Combining (4.3) and (4.5), we obtain the product kernel function
for the conditioning vector Xi:
Khλ,ji ≡ Khλ (Xj ,Xi) = Qh
¡
Xcj −Xci
¢
Lλ
³
Xdj ,X
d
i
´
. (4.6)
Now, fix a point Xi = (Xc
0
i ,X
d0
i )
0
. It follows from the first order Taylor expansion that
F (z|Xj , y) ≈ F (z|Xi, y) +
.
F (z|Xi, y)0
¡
Xcj −Xci
¢
(4.7)
for any Xcj in the neighborhood of X
c
i and X
d
j = X
d
i , where
.
F (z|x, y) = ∂F (z|x) /∂xc, i.e.,
the derivative is only taken with respect to the continuous component xc of x ≡ (xc0, xd0)0 .
Given observations {(Xi, Yi, Zi)}ni=1 , we estimate F (Zi|Xi, y) by solving the weighted least
squares minimization problem
min
β
nX
j=1
£
1 {Zj ≤ Zi}− β0 − β01
¡¡
Xcj −Xci
¢
/h
¢¤2Khλ,ji1yj , (4.8)
where β ≡
¡
β0, β
0
1
¢0 and 1yj ≡ 1 (Yj = y) . Our estimator bF (Zi|Xi, y) is the minimizing inter-
cept term in the above problem. Let τh
³
Xcj − xc
´
≡
µ
1,
³³
Xcj − xc
´
/h
´0¶0
. Then it is easy
to verify that
bF (Zi|Xi, y) = e01 [Sny (Xi)]−1 1n
nX
j=1
Khλ,ji1
y
jτ h
¡
Xcj −Xci
¢
1 (Zj ≤ Zi)
where e1 ≡ (1, 0, · · · , 0)0 is a (pc + 1)-vector, and Sny (Xi) ≡ 1n
Pn
j=1Khλ,ji1
y
jτh(Xcj−Xci )τh(Xcj−
Xci )
0.
We measure the variations in bF (Zi|Xi, y) across diﬀerent values of y and diﬀerent obser-
vations by
Dn ≡
cy−2X
r=0
cy−1X
s=r+1
nX
i=1
h bF (Zi|Xi, r)− bF (Zi|Xi, s)i2 .
We study the asymptotic properties of Dn under H0, a sequence of Pitman local alternatives,
and the global alternative H1. We will show that after being appropriately recentered and
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scaled, Dn is asymptotically normally distributed under the null and local alternatives, and
diverges to infinity under the global alternative.
4.2 Assumptions
Throughout the paper we use ξi, ζi, and ς i to denote (X 0i, Yi, Zi)
0 , (X 0i, Yi)
0 , and (X 0i, Zi)
0 ,
respectively. Similarly, let ξ ≡ (x0, y, z)0 , ζ ≡ (x0, y)0 and ς ≡ (x0, z)0 . With a little bit abuse
of notation, we use p (ξ) , p (ζ) , and p (x) denote the PDF of ξi, ζi, and Xi, respectively.
Similarly, F (z|x, y) ≡ F (z|xc, xd, y) denotes the conditional CDF of Zi given (Xc0i ,Xd
0
i , Yi)
0
.
To facilitate our asymptotic analysis, we make the following assumptions.
Assumption A.1 The sequence {ξi}ni=1 is independent and identically distributed (IID) with
CDF Fξ.
Assumption A.2 (i) The support X c of Xci is compact.
(ii) p (ξ) is uniformly bounded over its support X × Y × Z, where X ≡ X c × X d, X d ≡
X d1 × · · · × X dpd , and Z is the support of Zi. p (ζ) ≡ p
¡
xc, xd, y
¢
is bounded away from 0 for
all xc ∈ X c, xd ∈ X d, and y ∈ Y.
Assumption A.3 Let η ≡
¡
xd, y
¢
. (i) For each η ∈ X d×Y and z ∈ Z, F (z|xc, η) is Lipschitz
continuous in xc ∈ X c and has all partial derivatives up to order 2 with respect to xc.
(ii) For each η ∈ X d × Y and z ∈ Z, the second order partial derivatives with respect to
xc, ∂2F (z|xc, η)/∂xcs∂xct , s, t = 1, · · · , pc, are uniformly bounded and Hölder continuous on
X c : for xc, x˜c ∈ X c, |∂2F (z|xc, η)/∂xcs∂xct −∂2F (z|exc, η)/∂xcs∂xct | ≤ C ||xc− exc||, where C is
a generic finite constant and k·k denotes the Euclidean norm.
(iii) For each xc ∈ X c and η ∈ X d×Y, |F (z|xc, η)−F (ez|xc, η) | ≤ C |z−ez| for all z, ez ∈ Z.
Assumption A.4 (i) The kernel function q : R → R+ is a continuous, bounded, and sym-
metric PDF.
(ii) u→ |u|4 q (u) is integrable on R with respect to Lebesgue measure.
(iii) Let qj(u) ≡ ujq(u) for all j = 0, · · · , 3. For some C1 < ∞ and C2 < ∞, either q (·)
is compactly supported such that q (u) = 0 for |u| > C1, and |qj(u)− qj(eu)| ≤ C2 |u− eu| for
any u, eu ∈ R and for all j = 0, · · · , 3; or q(·) is diﬀerentiable, |dqj (u) /du| ≤ C1, and for some
ι0 > 1, |dqj (u) /du| ≤ C1 |u|−ι0 for all |u| > C2 and for all j = 0, · · · , 3.
Assumption A.5 Let h! ≡ Πpcs=1hs. As n → ∞, khk → 0, kλk → 0, ||λ|| is of the same
order as ||h||2, n (h!)2 / logn→∞, n (h!)1/2 khk4 → 0, and khk4 /h!→ 0.
Remark 1. The IID assumption in assumption A.1 is standard in cross sectional study.
One could allow heterogeneity but that would complicate the presentation to a large de-
gree. Assumption A.2 is standard for nonparametric local polynomial estimation with mixed
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regressors. Assumptions A.3-A.4 are used to obtain uniform consistency for the local poly-
nomial estimator of Masry (1996) and Hansen (2008). Assumption A.5 imposes appropriate
conditions on the bandwidth. In particular A.5 implies that undersmoothing is required for
our test and pc < 4. This is typical in nonparametric tests when local linear regression is
involved. In the case where pc ≥ 4, one has to rely upon higher order local polynomial
regressions.
4.3 The Asymptotic Distribution of the Test Statistic
Let Sy (x) ≡ E[Khλ (Xj , x)1yjτh(Xcj−xc)τh(Xcj−xc)0],Ky
¡
ζj , x
¢
≡ e01[Sy (x)]−1τh
³
Xcj − xc
´
Khλ(Xj , x)1
y
j , and 1z,y (ς i) ≡ 1 {Zi ≤ z} −F (z|Xi, y) . Define
Bn ≡
(h!)1/2
n2
nX
i=1
nX
j=1
cy−2X
r=0
cy−1X
s=r+1
£
Kr
¡
ζj ,Xi
¢
1Zi,r (ςj)−Ks
¡
ζj ,Xi
¢
1Zi,s (ςj)
¤2 , (4.9)
and
σ2n ≡ 2h!EiEj
⎡
⎣
cy−2X
r=0
cy−1X
s=r+1
Z ©
Kr (ζi;x)1z,r (ςi)−Ks (ζi, x)1z,s (ςi)
ª {Kr ¡ζj ;x¢1z,r (ςj)
− Ks (ζi, x)1z,s (ς i)}Fξ (dξ)
¸2
(4.10)
where Ei denote the expectation with respect to ξi. Let σ20 ≡ limn→∞ σ2n.
Our first result says that after centering, (h!)1/2Dn is asymptotically normally distributed
under H0.
Theorem 4.1 Suppose Assumptions A.1-A.5 hold. Then under H0, (h!)
1/2Dn − Bn
d→
N
¡
0, σ20
¢
.
To implement the test, we need to consistently estimate Bn and σ20. For this purpose, letb1Zi,y (ςj) ≡ 1 {Zj ≤ Zi}− bF (Zi|Xj , y) . Let bKr ¡ζj ;x¢ ≡ e01[Snr (x)]−1τh ³Xcj − xc´Khλ (Xj , x)1yj .
Let
bαij,rs ≡ bKr ¡ζj ;Xi¢ b1Zi,r (ςj)− bKs ¡ζj ;Xi¢ b1Zi,s (ςj) , and bβij,rs ≡ 1n
nX
l=1
bαli,rsbαlj,rs.
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Define
bBn ≡ (h!)1/2n2
nX
i=1
nX
j=1
cy−2X
r=0
cy−1X
s=r+1
bα2ij,rs, and bσ2n ≡ 2h!n (n− 1)
nX
i=1
nX
j 6=i
⎡
⎣
cy−2X
r=0
cy−1X
s=r+1
bβij,rs
⎤
⎦
2
.
We demonstrate in Theorem 4.2 below that bBn − Bn = oP (1) and bσ2n − σ20 = oP (1) . Then
we can compare
Tn ≡
³
(h!)1/2Dn − bBn´ /qbσ2n (4.11)
to the one-sided critical value zα, the upper α percentile from the N (0, 1) distribution. We
reject the null at level α if Tn > zα.
To examine the asymptotic local power of the test, we consider the following sequence of
Pitman local alternatives:
H1 (γn) : F (z|x, r)− F (z|x, s) = γnδn,rs (ς) for a.e. ξ, (4.12)
where γn → 0 as n→∞ and δn,rs (·) is a continuous function such that μ0 ≡ limn→∞
Pcy−2
r=0Pcy−1
s=r+1E[δn,rs (ς i)]
2 <∞. The following theorem establishes the local power of the test.
Theorem 4.2 Suppose Assumptions A.1-A.5 hold. Then under H1 (γn) with γn = n−1/2(h!)−1/4,
Tn
d→ N (μ0/σ0, 1) .
Thus, the test has nontrivial power against Pitman local alternatives that converge to zero
at rate n−1/2(h!)−1/4. The asymptotic local power function is given by 1 − Φ (zα − μ0/σ0) ,
where Φ is the standard normal CDF.
The following theorem establishes the consistency of the test under the global alternative
H1 stated in (4.2).
Theorem 4.3 Suppose Assumptions A.1-A.5 hold. Then under H1, n−1(h!)−1/2Tn = μA/σ0+
oP (1) , where μA ≡
Pcy−2
r=0
Pcy−1
s=r+1E [F (Zi|Xi, r)− F (Zi|Xi, s)]2 , so that P (Tn > cn) → 1
under H1 for any nonstochastic sequence cn = o
¡
n(h!)1/2
¢
.
Remark 2. Alternatively, one can consider testing the conditional independence of Y
and Z given X based upon the comparison of F (z|x) with F (z|x, y) . In this case, the test
statistic would be eDn ≡ nX
i=1
h eF (Zi|Xi)− eF (Zi|Xi, Yi)i2 ,
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where eF (z|x) and eF (z|x, y) are local linear estimates of F (z|x) and F (z|x, y) by smoothing all
discrete variables in Xi and (Xi, Yi) , respectively. After being suitably centered and rescaled,eDn can be shown to be asymptotically normally distributed. The key assumption for the
asymptotic normality of eDn would require that the bandwidth (λy, say) used in smoothing
the discrete variable Yi tends to zero as n → ∞. Nevertheless, under the null hypothesis of
conditional independence, Yi is an irrelevant variable in the prediction of Zi or 1 (Zi ≤ z) ,
implying that the optimal bandwidth for λy should tend to 1 as n → ∞ (see Li and Racine
(2007)). Thus this creates a dilemma for the choice of λy, making it extremely diﬃcult to
control the finite sample level of a test based upon eDn. In contrast, when we construct our
Dn test statistic, we obtain the estimate bF (Zi|Xi, y) of F (Zi|Xi, y) for diﬀerent values of y
without smoothing the discrete variable Yi (see (4.8)) and thus avoid the above dilemma.
5 Monte Carlo Simulations
In this section we conduct some Monte Carlo experiments to evaluate the finite sample per-
formance of our test. We consider two data generating processes (DGPs):
DGP 1.
Yi = 1 (εY i ≤ mY (Xi)) ,
Zi = 1 (εZi ≤ mZ (Xi)) ,
mY (Xi) =
Xci1 − 0.5 (Xci1)
2 + φ (Xci2)−Xci1Xci2 − 0.5Xci1Xdi1 + 0.5Xdi1 + 0.5Xdi1Xdi2q
1 +Xc2i1 +X
c2
i2
,
mZ (Xi) = φ (Xci1)X
c
i2 −Xci1 −Xci2Xdi2 + 0.5Xdi1Xdi2 + δYiXci1,
where Xi ≡
¡
Xci1,X
c
i2,X
d
i1,X
d
i2
¢0 , φ is the N (0, 1) PDF, Xci1 is IID U (0, 4) , Xci2 is IID,
computed as the sum of 48 independent random variables, each uniformly distributed on
[−0.25, 0.25], P
¡
Xdi1 = l
¢
= 1/4 for l = 0, 1, 2, 3, P
¡
Xdi2 = l
¢
= 1/5 for l = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, εY 1 is
IID N (0, 1), εZi is IID N (0, 1), and all these variables are mutually independent. δ controls
the degree of conditional dependence between Yi and Zi given Xi. Given Xi, Yi and Zi are
conditionally independent when δ = 0 and conditionally dependent otherwise.
DGP 2.
Yi = 1 (εY i ≤ mY (Xi)) ,
Zi = mZ (Xi) + s εZi,
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where Xi ≡
¡
Xci1,X
c
i2,X
d
i1,X
d
i2
¢0 , εY i and εZi are generated as in DGP 1, mY and mZ are as
defined in DGP1, and s is taken to ensure the signal-noise ratio in the equation for Zi to be
1 across all simulations.
Clearly, DGP 1 generates binary Yi and Zi variables whereas DGP 2 generates binary
Yi and continuous Zi. In both DGPs the Xi vector includes two continuous variables, Xci1
and Xci2, and two discrete variables, X
d
i1 and X
d
i2. Note that our test is based on local
linear regressions, which typically requires compactly supported conditioning variables. This
motivates the otherwise awkward way we generate Xci2 in DGPs 1-2. According to the central
limit theorem, we can treat Xci2 as being nearly standard normal random variables but with
compact support [−12, 12].
Notice that the two discrete variables in Xi partition the data into 4 × 5 = 20 cells. In
conjunction with the 2 categories of dummy Yi, this will partition the data into 20× 2 = 40
cells if we adopt the conventional nonparametric frequency approach to do the estimation
and testing. If the number of observations n is small, say, 100, each cell has a tiny amount
of observations on average and some empty cells in practice, this will make the estimation
of the CDF F (z|x, y) extremely diﬃcult. A nonparametric-frequency-based test should not
be expected to perform well in terms of both level and power. Even with nonparametric
smoothing over the discrete variables in Xi as advocated by our test, the problem continues
to be hard but less severe.
To construct the test statistic, we need to choose both kernel and bandwidth. We choose
the product of Gaussian kernel for the two continuous regressors: q (x) = (2π)−1/2 exp
¡
−x2/2
¢
.
Since there is no data-driven procedure to choose the bandwidths h = (h1, h2)0 and λ =
(λ1, λ2)0 for our testing problem, we choose them according to the rule of thumb:
hl = γsXcl n
−1/4.5, λl = γn−2/4.5for l = 1, 2, (5.1)
where sXcl is the sample standard deviation of X
c
il and γ is a fixed constant. We study the
behavior of our test with diﬀerent choices of γ in order to examine the sensitivity of our test
to the bandwidth sequence. Robinson (1991, p.448) proposes very similar devices. Note that
these choices for h and λ and the kernel function meet the requirements for our test. Through
a preliminary simulation study, we find our bootstrap-based test is not sensitive to the choice
of γ when we take γ ∈ [0.5, 2] . So we fix γ = 1 for our simulation results.
It is well known that the asymptotic normal distribution typically cannot approximate the
finite sample distribution of many nonparametric test statistics. This is especially true for
our test when we have discrete conditioning variables in Xi with reasonably large number of
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categories. So we suggest using a bootstrap method to obtain the bootstrap p-values. Here,
we generate the bootstrap data {(X∗i , Y ∗i , Z∗i )}ni=1 based on the following local bootstrap
procedure:
1. Set (X∗i , Y
∗
i ) = (Xi, Yi) for each i ∈ {1, · · · , n} .
2. For i = 1, · · ·n, given X∗i , draw Z∗i from the following local constant nonparametric
estimate of F (z|X∗i ) :
eFhhhλ (z|X∗i ) =
Pn
j=1Khhhλ (Xj ,X
∗
i )1 (Zj ≤ z)Pn
j=1Khhhλ (Xj ,X
∗
i )
(5.2)
where eh and eλ are the bandwidth used in the estimation of F (z|X∗i ) .
3. Compute the bootstrap test statistic T ∗n in the same way as Tn by using {(X∗i , Y ∗i , Z∗i )}ni=1
instead.
4. Repeat steps 1-3 B times to obtain B bootstrap test statistic
n
T ∗nj
oB
j=1
. Calculate
the bootstrap p-values p∗ ≡ B−1
PB
j=1 1
³
T ∗nj ≥ Tn
´
and reject the null hypothesis of
conditional independence if p∗is smaller than the prescribed level of significance.
The above procedure is coined as the local bootstrap procedure by Paparoditis and Politis
(2000) who also explain how to generate the bootstrap observations computationally. It works
no matter whether Zi is discrete or continuous. In the case where Zi is continuous, we can
also generate a smooth version of Z∗i through Z
∗∗
i = Z
∗
i + bηi, where b ≡ b (n)→ 0 as n→∞,
and ηi is drawn from N (0, 1) . In our simulations and applications, we generate Z∗i and Z
∗∗
i
for the case where Zi is discrete and continuous, respectively. When Zi is continuous, we set
b = sZn−1/6 with sZ being the sample standard deviation of Zi. Our simulations indicate that
the choice of b plays little role in the performance of our test. For simplicity, we set eh = h
and eλ = λ.
Table 1 reports the empirical rejection frequencies of our test at 1%, 5%, and 10% nominal
levels for DGPs 1-2. Also reported in the table is a variant of our test based on the idea
of nonparametric frequency, which is obtained by setting the smoothing parameters for the
discrete variables inXi to be 0 in the calculation of our test statistic. To save on computational
time, we use 250 replications for each sample size n and 100 bootstrap resamples in each
replication. We summarize some important findings from Table 1.
First, the level of our nonparametric smoothing test is reasonably well behaved despite
the fact that it tends to be oversized when n is small and the average number of observations
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Table 1: Finite sample rejection frequency for DGPs 1-2
DGP Sample δ Our test Nonparametric frequency approach
size hl = sXcl n
−1/4.5, λl = n−2/4.5 hl = sXcl n
−1/4.5, λl = 0
n 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10%
1 200 0 0.036 0.092 0.144 0.100 0.224 0.288
1 0.420 0.592 0.644 0.200 0.268 0.348
2 0.900 0.920 0.924 0.472 0.620 0.656
400 0 0.024 0.068 0.104 0.088 0.216 0.296
1 0.628 0.720 0.764 0.156 0.312 0.384
2 0.904 0.924 0.932 0.512 0.648 0.728
800 0 0.016 0.040 0.068 0.160 0.348 0.448
1 0.840 0.880 0.884 0.204 0.396 0.492
2 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.628 0.752 0.836
2 200 0 0.020 0.068 0.124 0.028 0.080 0.176
1 0.064 0.160 0.268 0.068 0.172 0.232
2 0.176 0.300 0.448 0.088 0.240 0.312
400 0 0.004 0.016 0.072 0.032 0.132 0.196
1 0.080 0.192 0.288 0.068 0.172 0.248
2 0.268 0.504 0.632 0.100 0.196 0.328
800 0 0.000 0.032 0.056 0.020 0.128 0.216
1 0.168 0.304 0.408 0.100 0.276 0.360
2 0.600 0.768 0.812 0.136 0.296 0.380
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per cell is small. In the case where n = 200, Xdi ≡ (Xdi1, Xdi2)0 and Yi partition the 200
observations into 40 cells so that each cell contains only 5 observations on average. Given
the two conditioning variables Xci1 and X
c
i2, one cannot expect the conditional CDF for each
cell values of Xdi and Yi to be well estimated no matter whether we choose to smooth X
d
i
or not. This definitely has some adverse eﬀect on the performance of our test. Despite this,
our nonparametric smoothing test seems to perform well even if n is small and the average
number of observations per cell is small. As n and the average number of observations per
cell double, the levels of our test tend to be improved and get close to the nominal levels.
Second, our test has power to detect deviations from conditional independence no matter
whether Zi is discrete or continuous. In DGP 1 when δ changes from 0 to 1 (resp. 2) so
that Yi becomes to aﬀect Zi conditional on Xi, the unconditional probability for Zi to take
value 1 increases from 0.38 to 0.52 (resp. 0.60). Our nonparametric smoothing test can detect
such changes very well even for small n. As n doubles, the above changes of unconditional
probabilities remain the same as we change δ, but the power of our test increases. In DGP 2,
Zi is continuously valued. The power performance does not appear to be as well as the case of
DGP 1 because we normalize the error terms in the equation for Zi to ensure the signal-noise
ratio to be 1 across diﬀerent values of δ. If we set s = 1 in the equation for Zi and allow the
signal become stronger as δ increases, we can observe significant improvement of the power
performance of our test.
Third, in terms of both size and power, our smoothing nonparametric test significantly
dominates the nonparametric-frequency-based test. The latter test tends to be oversized
for both DGPs and all sample sizes under investigation. Despite its oversize, as expected,
the latter test is much less powerful in detecting deviations from the null of conditional
independence than our nonparametric smoothing test.
6 Empirical Applications
In this section we apply the nonparametric test to an automobile insurance data set.10 We
first briefly introduce the automobile insurance market in France where our data set stems
from, then discuss configurations of the data set and present our empirical findings. Noting
that the design of automobile insurance is relatively similar in most countries, so we believe
that our methodology is broadly applicable.
10Despite the scarcity of insurance data sets the car insurance has been analyzed for diﬀerent countries
amongst others by Chiappori and Salanié (1997, 2000), Richaudeau (1999), Cohen (2005), Saito (2006) and
Kim et. al. (2009).
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6.1 Principles of the Automobile Insurance in France
In France, like in many other countries, all cars must be insured at the “responsabilité civile”
(RC) level. This is a liability insurance that covers damage inflicted to other drivers and
their cars. Moreover, insurance companies oﬀer additional non-compulsory coverage. The
most common one is called “assurance tous risques” (TR), which also covers damage to the
insured car or the driver in the case of an accident at which he or she is at fault. The insurees
can choose from diﬀerent comprehensive insurance contracts which vary in the value of the
deductible (fixed or proportional).
A special feature of the car insurance is the so called “bonus/ malus”, a uniform experience
rating system. At any date/year t, the premium is defined as the product of a basis amount and
a “bonus” coeﬃcient. The basic amount can be defined freely by the insurance companies
according to their risk classification but cannot be related to past experience. The past
experience is captured by the so called “bonus/ malus” coeﬃcient whose evolution is strictly
regulated. Suppose, the bonus coeﬃcient is bt at the beginning of the tth period. Then the
occurrence of an accident during the period leads to an increase of 25 percent at the end of
the period (i.e., bt+1 = 1.25bt), whereas an accident-free year implies a reduction of 5 percent
at the end (i.e., bt+1 = 0.95bt). Additionally, several special rules are applied, which include
the permission to overcharge contracts held by young drivers. But the surcharge is limited to
140 percent of the basis rate and is forced to decrease by half every year in which the insuree
has not had an accident.
The basis amount of the premium is calculated according to diﬀerent risk classes. Due
to variables like age, sex, profession, area, etc., the insurees are divided into diﬀerent risk
classes which should reflect their accident probabilities, and the premium to be paid is then
determined.
6.2 Configurations of the Data Set
We use a data set of the French federation of insurers11 (FFSA) which conducted in 1990 a
survey of its members. This data set was also used in Chiappori and Salanié (1997, 2000).
With a sampling rate of 1/20 the data set consists of 41 variables on 1, 120, 000 contracts and
25 variables on 120, 000 accidents for the year 1989. For each driver all variables which are
used by insurance companies for pricing their contracts - age of the driver, sex, profession of
the driver, year of drivers license, age of the car, type of the car, use of the car, and area -
plus the characteristics of the contract and the characteristics of the accident, if occurred, are
11The FFSA comprehends 21 companies that together have 70 percent market share of the French automobile
insurance market.
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available. We restrict our analysis to all “young”12 drivers who obtained their driver license
in 1988. This reduces the sample size to n = 6, 333.
As Chiappori and Salanié (2000) argue, focusing on young drivers has two major advant-
ages. In a subsample of young drivers the driving experience is much more homogeneous than
that in the total population in which groups of diﬀerent experiences are pooled. Therefore the
heteroskedasticity problem is mitigated and less severe. The concentration on young drivers
also avoids the problems associated with the experience rating and the resulting bias. The
past driving history is usually observed by the insurance companies. The past driving records
are highly informative on probabilities of accident and used for pricing. The bonus coeﬃcient
is a very excellent proxy for this variable. However, the introduction of this variable is quite
delicate because of its endogeneity. This problem can be circumvented either by using panel
data13 or by using only data on beginners. We pursue the second approach and concentrate
on novice drivers.
One important issue in testing for asymmetric information is the distinction between
accidents and claims. The data set of insurance companies comprise claims. But whether an
accident - once it has occurred - is declared to the insurance company and becomes a claim
depends on the decision of the insuree. This decision is mainly determined by the nature of
the contract. For example, accidents whose damage is below the deductible or is not covered
are usually not declared. Therefore one might expect a positive correlation between the type
of contract (coverage) and the probability of a claim - even in the absence of ex ante moral
hazard.14 One strategy to handle this problem is to discard all accidents in which only one
automobile was involved. Whenever two cars are involved, a declaration is nearly inevitable.
To make the results comparable with those of Chiappori and Salanié (2000) and to check
for robustness we examine several diﬀerent configurations of the data set. Let Xi denote the
set of exogenous control variables for individual i. Let Yi = 0 if individual i buys only the
minimum legal coverage (a RC contract) and 1 if individual i buys any form of comprehensive
coverage (a TR contract). First we consider discrete Zi where Zi = 1 if i has at least one
accident in which he or she is judged to be at fault and 0 otherwise (no accident occurred or i
was not at fault). Then we consider the case where Zi is continuous and defined by the total
payments caused by the insuree, which is also included in the data set.
For the random variables in Xi, we consider three configurations. In Configuration I we
include the following control variables in Xi : sex (2), make of car (8), performance of the
12“Young” refers not to the actual age but to the driving experience.
13For a detailed discussion see Chiappori and Heckmann (1999).
14The phenomenon that accidents that are not covered are not declared is sometimes called “ex post moral
hazard”.
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car (6), type of use (4), type of area (5), profession of the driver (8), region (10), age of the
driver, and age of the car, where numbers in brackets indicate the number of categories for the
corresponding discrete variables, and variables without numbers indicate they are continuous
variables. These control variables are similar to those used by Chiappori and Salanié (2000)
for their probit-model- or χ2-based tests except that we do not transform the age of the car
and that of the driver to discrete variables.
Our nonparametric test requires that the number of observations per cell should not be
too small. So we also consider another two configurations for Xi. In Configuration II we omit
the variable, make of the car, which describes the home country of the manufacturer of the
car. We think that the most important part of the information concerning an automobile can
be captured by the performance of the car, so that the omission of this variable should have no
significant influence on the results. For example, the accident probability of an Italian and a
French compact car should not diﬀer significantly, all other things being equal. Additionally,
we reduce the number of categories for some discrete variables according to Column 3 in Table
2. Again, we argue that merging categories which are nearly identical or closely related does
not bias the results.
In Configuration III we use only two categories for each of the seven discrete variables in
Xi. As surveyed above, Salanié and Chiappori (2000) also conduct nonparametric tests where
they code all control variables as binary and apply a χ2 independence test to each cell, and
then aggregate the resulting test statistics in three diﬀerent ways. Our third configuration
enables a direct comparison of our nonparametric test with their nonparametric tests.
Configurations IV - VI correspond to Configurations I - III, respectively. In the settings
IV - VI we only replace the discrete dummy variable Zi by its continuous counterpart, i.e., by
the total payments caused through accidents by the insuree to the insurance company. In all
configurations, we treat the age of the car and the age of the driver as continuous variables.
See Table 2 for a summary of these configurations.
6.3 Empirical Results
In this subsection we apply the nonparametric test to the data set introduced in the above
subsection. Table 3 reports the bootstrap p-values for our nonparametric test under vari-
ous configurations of the data set. Given the large sample size (n = 6, 333) and the need
of bootstrap, the computational burden for our bootstrap-based nonparametric test is very
heavy. Simulations for smaller sample sizes with diﬀerent choices of the number of bootstrap
replications (B = 100, 200, 300) indicate that our testing results are insensitive to the choice
of B. So we only set B = 100 for our applications. Also due to the large sample size and the
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Table 2: An overview of the data configurations
Variables\Configurations I II III IV V VI
Yi 2 2 2 2 2 2
Zi 2 2 2 X X X
sex 2 2 2 2 2 2
make of car 8 - 2 8 - 2
performance of car 6 6 2 6 6 2
type of use 4 3 2 4 3 2
type of area 5 2 2 5 2 2
profession of driver 9 5 2 9 5 2
region 10 5 2 10 5 2
age of driver X X X X X X
age of car X X X X X X
Note: Integers denote the number of categories for the corresponding discrete variables.
An “X” in the table denotes the corresponding variable is a continuous variable.
Table 3: Bootstrap p values for our nonparametric test under various configurations
γ\Configurations I II III IV V VI
γ = 0.75 0.82 0.54 0.24 1.00 1.00 1.00
γ = 1 0.79 0.62 0.13 1.00 1.00 1.00
γ = 1.25 0.77 0.66 0.14 1.00 1.00 1.00
γ = 1.5 0.76 0.72 0.21 1.00 1.00 1.00
large number of control variables, it is diﬃcult to use least squares cross validation method to
choose data-driven bandwidths to conduct our nonparametric test. For this reason we adopt
the rule of thumb to choose the bandwidths: hl = γsXcl n
−1/4.5 and λs = γn−2/4.5 for the
continuous and discrete control variables, respectively. To check the sensitivity of the test to
the choice of bandwidth, we consider four values of γ : 0.75, 1, 1.25, and 1.5. These choices
of bandwidths fulfill the requirements of Assumption A.5.
We summarize some important findings from Table 3. First, it indicates that in all cases
we fail to reject the null hypothesis of absence of asymmetric information at the 10% signi-
ficance level. This means that the knowledge of the choice of the contract does not contain
information for predicting the probability of an accident or the other way round, knowing the
number of accidents (discrete) or the caused damages (continuous) is of no value for predicting
the chosen contract. Therefore our test aﬃrms the Chiappori and Salanié’s (2000) findings
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that there is no evidence of asymmetric information in the market for automobile insurance
in France. The results are very robust to diﬀerent configurations of data and choices of band-
width. Second, Table 3 reveals that an aggregation of the categories of the discrete control
variables leads to a decrease of the p-values so that a reduction of information might disguise
asymmetric information. Therefore, a (non-)parametric test that relies on highly aggregated
information might yield misleading or wrong conclusions. Third, Table 3 also reveals that
using the payments of the insurance companies instead of the number of accidents leads to a
strengthening of the absence of asymmetric information. Again, a reduction of information
might lead to wrong test conclusions.
Recently Kim et al. (2009) have argued that the absence of asymmetric information in
most empirical studies might be due to the dichotomous measurement approach that induces
the excessive bundling of contracts with diﬀerent deductibles. In reality the insurees can
choose between several deductibles referring to diﬀerent fields of coverage. But most studies
aggregate this choice opportunities to a binary choice between “compulsory” coverage and
“additional” coverage so that the choice variable Yi becomes binary. Kim et al. (2009) claim
that excessive bundling in coverage measurements might disguise the existence of asymmetric
information. So they apply a multinomial measurement approach, which is parametric in
nature, and demonstrate the evidence of asymmetric information in their data set obtained
from a major automobile insurance company in Korea.
Since our data set also contains the exact level of the chosen deductible, we can investigate
this hypothesis as our test is fully applicable to this problem. A very small proportion of the
contracts has proportional deductibles which are dropped for this analysis. Therefore the
sample size decreases to n = 6, 219. We divide the chosen deductible into three (0 − 100,
101 − 1500, and > 1500) groups. The results are reported in Table 4 for diﬀerent data
configurations introduced above. In comparison to the settings defined in Table 2, the choice
variable Yi now has three categories, but everything else remains unchanged in the data
set. Clearly, Table 4 confirms the absence of asymmetric information in the data. We also
tried a finer division for the deductible so that Yi has more categories. In all cases, our
results are robust in that they all confirm the absence of asymmetric information in the
data. Intuitively speaking, if there is no asymmetric information in the most important
choice between compulsory and comprehensive insurance, one should not expect asymmetric
information in the minor decision of the exact deductible when the money at stack is not so
high.
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Table 4: Bootstrap p values for our nonparametric test when the choice variable has three
deductible levels
γ\Configurations I II III
γ = 0.75 0.71 0.73 0.73
γ = 1 0.67 0.71 0.88
γ = 1.25 0.69 0.64 0.68
γ = 1.5 0.64 0.77 0.75
7 Concluding Remarks
We propose a new nonparametric test for asymmetric information in this paper and apply
it to a French automobile insurance data set. Our main conclusion is that we cannot detect
asymmetric information in the data set despite diﬀerent configurations of the control variables
and diﬀerent choices of bandwidth parameters. Our nonparametric test does not require spe-
cification of any functional or distributional form among the sets of variables of interest and
it is not subject to any misspecification problem given the right choice of control variables.
We also show that excessive bundling does not necessarily result in a disguise of asymmetric
information. Both in the case of the binary choice between “compulsory” coverage and “ad-
ditional” coverage and in the case of several deductibles (three and more groups) we confirm
the absence of asymmetric information. Our results are also very strong in contrast to Kim
et al. (2009).
Since nearly all other classes of insurance, such as the legal protection insurance, private
health insurance, and disability insurance, are structured in the same way as the auto insur-
ance, applications to data sets in these subfields are immediate and might help to gain new
insights. Moreover, our test can be applied to more general settings, either to testing for
asymmetric information in other fields or more generally, to testing the general hypothesis of
conditional independence.
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A Mathematical Appendix
Let ∆j,y (x, z) ≡ F (z|Xj , y)−F (z|x, y)−
Ppc
s=1
¡
∂F
¡
z|xc, xd, y¢ /∂xcs¢ ³Xcjs − xcs´ , Vny (ς) ≡
1
n
Pn
j=1 Khλ (Xj , x)1
y
jτh(Xcj − xc)1z,y (ςj) , and Bny (ς) ≡ 1n
Pn
j=1Khλ (Xj , x)1
y
jτh(Xcj −
xc)∆j,y (x, z) . Let Sy (x) ≡ E[Sny (x)] and By (ς) ≡ E[Bny (ς)]. The following lemma estab-
lishes the uniform consistency of bF (z|x, y) .
Lemma A.1 Suppose Assumptions A.1-A.5 hold. Then uniformly in ξ ≡ (x0, y, z)0 we have:bF (z|x, y) −F (z|x, y) = e01[Sy (x)]−1[Vny (ς)+By (ς)] +OP (ν2n +νn(khk2+ kλk)) = OP (νn+
khk2 + kλk), where νn ≡ n−1/2 (h!)−1/2
√
logn.
Proof. Since [Sny (x)]−1 Sny (x) = Ipc+1 where Ipc+1 is a (pc + 1) × (pc + 1) identity
matrix, we obtain the following standard bias and variance decomposition:
bF (z|x, y)− F (z|x, y) = e01[Sny (x)]−1Vny (ς) + e01[Sny (x)]−1Bny (ς) , (A.1)
where e01 is the first row of Ipc+1. By Theorems 2 and 4 in Masry (1996) with little modification
to account for discrete regressors,15
Sny (x) = Sy (x) +OP (νn) ,Vny (ς) = OP (νn) , and Bny (ς)−By (ς) = OP (νn(khk2 + kλk)),
where the probability orders hold uniformly in x ∈ X and y ∈ Y. By the Slutsky lemma,
[Sny (x)]−1 =
©
Sy (x) +
£
Sny (x)− Sy (x)
¤ª−1
= [Sy (x)]−1 +OP (νn) . (A.2)
By the same argument as used in the proof of Theorem 4.1 of Boente and Fraiman (1991),
we can show that Vny (ς) = OP (νn) uniformly in ς under Assumption A.3. It follows thatbF (z|x, y) −F (z|x, y) = e01{[Sy (x)]−1 + OP (νn)}{Vny (ς) +[By (ς) +OP (νn(khk2 + kλk)]}
= e01[Sy (x)]−1[Vny (ς) +By (ς)] +OP (ν
2
n +νn(khk2 + kλk)) = OP (νn + khk2 + kλk).
Proof of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2
We only prove Theorem 4.2, as the proof of Theorem 4.1 is a special case.
15The compact support of the kernel function in Masry (1996) can be easily relaxed, following the line of proof
in Hansen (2008, Theorem 4). Masry (1996) only allows continuous regressors, which can also be extended to
the case of mixed regressors. Since Xdi and Yi only take finite number of possible values, they have no impact
on the uniform probability order.
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First, we decompose (h!)1/2Dn as follows:
(h!)1/2Dn = (h!)1/2
cy−2X
r=0
cy−1X
s=r+1
nX
i=1
h bF (Zi|Xi, r)− bF (Zi|Xi, s)i2
= (h!)1/2
cy−2X
r=0
cy−1X
s=r+1
nX
i=1
n£
F (Zi|Xi, r)− F (Zi|Xi, s)
¤2
+
h bF (Zi|Xi, r)− F (Zi|Xi, r)− bF (Zi|Xi, s) + F (Zi|Xi, s)i2
+2 [F (Zi|Xi, r)− F (Zi|Xi, s)]
×
h bF (Zi|Xi, r)− F (Zi|Xi, r)− bF (Zi|Xi, s) + F (Zi|Xi, s)io
≡ Dn1 +Dn2 + 2Dn3.
Under H1(n−1/2 (h!)−1/4), we prove the theorem by showing that (i) Dn1
P→ μ0, (ii) Dn2 −
Bn
d→ N
¡
0, σ20
¢
, (iii) Dn3 = oP (1) , (iv) bBn = Bn+oP (1) , and (v) bσ2n = σ20+oP (1). For (i),
Dn1 = n−1
Pcy−2
r=0
Pcy−1
s=r+1
Pn
i=1 δn,rs(ς i)
2 = μ0 + oP (1) under H1(n−1/2 (h!)
−1/4). It remains
to show (ii)-(iv).
To show (ii), we first apply Lemma A.1 to obtain
Dn2 = (h!)1/2
cy−2X
r=0
cy−1X
s=r+1
nX
i=1
h bF (Zi|Xi, r)− F (Zi|Xi, r)− bF (Zi|Xi, s) + F (Zi|Xi, s)i2
= (h!)1/2
cy−2X
r=0
cy−1X
s=r+1
nX
i=1
£
e01[Sr (Xi)]
−1Vnr (ς i)− e01[Ss (Xi)]−1Vns (ςi)
+ e01[Sr (Xi)]
−1Br (ς i)− e01[Ss (Xi)]−1Bs (ς i) +OP (ν2n + νn(khk2 + kλk))
i2
= (h!)1/2
cy−2X
r=0
cy−1X
s=r+1
nX
i=1
£
e01
©
[Sr (Xi)]−1Vnr (ςi)− [Ss (Xi)]−1Vns (ςi)
ª¤2
+ 2 (h!)1/2
cy−2X
r=0
cy−1X
s=r+1
nX
i=1
e01
©
[Sr (Xi)]−1Vnr (ς i)− [Ss (Xi)]−1Vns (ς i)
ª
× e01
©
[Sr (Xi)]−1Br (ς i)− [Ss (Xi)]−1Bs (ςi)
ª
+(h!)1/2
nX
i=1
£
e01
©
[Sr (Xi)]−1Br (ς i)− [Ss (Xi)]−1Bs (ς i)
ª¤2
+n (h!)1/2OP
³
ν2n + νn(khk2 + kλk))
´
OP
³
νn + khk2 + kλk
´
≡ Dn21 + 2Dn22 +Dn23 + oP (1) (A.3)
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where the definitions of Dn21, Dn22, and Dn23 are self-evident. Using the notation defined
above eq. (4.9), we haveDn21 =
(h!)1/2
(n−1)2
Pn
i=1
Pcy−2
r=0
Pcy−1
s=r+1[
Pn
j=1 ϕrs
¡
ξi, ξj
¢
]2, where ϕrs
¡
ξi, ξj
¢
≡ Kr
¡
ζj ;Xi
¢
1Zi,r (ςj)−Ks
¡
ζj ;Xi
¢
1Zi,s (ςj) . Decompose Dn21 as follows
Dn21 =
(h!)1/2
n2
nX
i=1
nX
j=1
nX
k=1
cy−2X
r=0
cy−1X
s=r+1
ϕrs
¡
ξi, ξj
¢
ϕrs (ξi, ξk)
=
(h!)1/2
n2
nX
i=1
nX
j 6=i
nX
k 6=i,j
cy−2X
r=0
cy−1X
s=r+1
ϕrs
¡
ξi, ξj
¢
ϕrs (ξi, ξk)
+
(h!)1/2
n2
nX
i=1
nX
j=1
cy−2X
r=0
cy−1X
s=r+1
ϕrs
¡
ξi, ξj
¢2
+
2 (h!)1/2
n2
nX
i=1
nX
j 6=i
cy−2X
r=0
cy−1X
s=r+1
ϕrs
¡
ξi, ξj
¢
ϕrs (ξi, ξi)
≡ Vn +Bn +Rn, say. (A.4)
Let ϕrs
¡
ξi, ξj , ξk
¢
≡ [ϕrs
¡
ξi, ξj
¢
ϕrs (ξi, ξk)+ϕrs
¡
ξj , ξi
¢
ϕrs
¡
ξj , ξk
¢
+ϕrs (ξk, ξi)ϕrs
¡
ξk, ξj
¢
]/3.
Then
Vn =
6 (h!)1/2
n2
X
1≤i<j<k≤n
cy−2X
r=0
cy−1X
s=r+1
ϕrs
¡
ξi, ξj , ξk
¢
=
(n− 1) (n− 2)
n
V n,
where V n ≡ 6(h!)
1/2
n(n−1)(n−2)
P
1≤i<j<k≤n
Pcy−2
r=0
Pcy−1
s=r+1 ϕrs
¡
ξi, ξj , ξk
¢
. Note that for all i 6=
j 6= k, θ ≡ E £ϕrs ¡ξi, ξj , ξk¢¤ = 0, ϕrs,1 (a) ≡ E £ϕrs ¡a, ξj , ξk¢¤ = 0, and ϕrs,2 (a,ea) ≡
E [ϕrs (a,ea, ξk)] = 13E[ϕrs (ξk, a) ϕrs (ξk,ea)]. Let ϕrs,3 (a,ea, a) ≡ ϕrs (a,ea, a) − ϕrs,2 (a,ea) −
ϕrs,2 (a, a)− ϕrs,2 (ea, a) . By the Hoeﬀding decomposition,
V n = 3H(2)n +H
(3)
n ,
whereH(2)n ≡ 2(h!)
1/2
n(n−1)
P
1≤i<j≤n
Pcy−2
r=0
Pcy−1
s=r+1 ϕrs,2
¡
ξi, ξj
¢
andH(3)n ≡ 6(h!)
1/2
n(n−1)(n−2)
P
1≤i<j<k≤nPcy−2
r=0
Pcy−1
s=r+1 ϕrs,3(ξi, ξj , ξk). Noting that E
£
ϕrs,3 (a,ea, ξi)¤ = 0 and that ϕrs,3 is symmet-
ric in its arguments by construction, it is straightforward to show that E[H(3)n ] = 0 and
E[H(3)n ]2 = O(n−3 (h!)−1). Hence, H
(3)
n = OP (n−3/2 (h!)
−1/2) = oP
¡
n−1
¢
by the Chebyshev
inequality. It follows that Vn =
n(n−2)
n−1 V n = {1 + o (1)}Hn + oP (1) , where
Hn ≡ 2 (h!)
1/2
n
X
1≤i≤j≤n
cy−2X
r=0
cy−1X
s=r+1
3ϕrs,2
¡
ξi, ξj
¢
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=
2 (h!)1/2
n
X
1≤i<j≤n
cy−2X
r=0
cy−1X
s=r+1
Z
ϕrs (a, ξi)ϕrs
¡
a, ξj
¢
Fξ (da) .
As Hn is a second order degenerate U -statistic, it is straightforward but tedious to verify
that all the conditions of Theorem 1 of Hall (1984) are satisfied, implying that a central
limit theorem applies to Hn : Hn d→ N
¡
0, σ20
¢
, where the asymptotic variance of Hn is
given by σ20 ≡ limn→∞ σ2n and σ2n ≡ 2h!EiEj [
Pcy−2
r=0
Pcy−1
s=r+1
R
ϕrs (ξ, ξi)ϕrs
¡
ξ, ξj
¢
Fξ (dξ)]2 =
2h!EiEj [
Pcy−2
r=0
Pcy−1
s=r+1
R
[Kr (ζi;x)1z,r (ς i)−Ks (ζi;x)1z,s (ςi)] [Kr
¡
ζj ;x
¢
1z,r (ςj)−Ks
¡
ζj ;x,
¢
1z,s (ςj)]Fξ (dξ)]2. Consequently
Vn
d→ N
¡
0, σ20
¢
. (A.5)
For Rn, it is easy to verify that E (Rn) = 0 and E
¡
R2n
¢
= O
¡
n(h!)−1
¢
= o (1) . So Rn = oP (1)
by the Chebyshev inequality. Combined with (A.4) and (A.5), we have
Dn21 −Bn
d→ N
¡
0, σ20
¢
. (A.6)
Let brs (ςi) ≡ e01
©
[Sr (Xi)]−1Br (ςi)− [Ss (Xi)]−1Bs (ςi)
ª
. Then Dn22 =
Pcy−2
r=0
Pcy−1
s=r+1
(Dn22,rs1−Dn22,rs2), where Dn22,rs1 ≡ (h!)1/2
Pn
i=1 e
0
1[Sr (Xi)]
−1Vnr (ς i) brs (ς i) and Dn22,rs2
≡ (h!)1/2
Pn
i=1 e
0
1[Ss (Xi)]
−1Vns (ς i) brs (ς i) . Write
Dn22,rs1 = n−1 (h!)1/2
nX
i=1
nX
j 6=i
e01[Sr (Xi)]
−1Khλ (Xj ,Xi)1rjτh(Xcj −Xci )1Zi,r (ςj) brs (ς i)
+n−1 (h!)1/2
nX
i=1
e01[Sr (Xi)]
−1Khλ (Xi,Xi)1riτh(Xci −Xci )1Zi,r (ς i) brs (ς i)
≡ Dn22,rs1a +Dn22,rs1b, say.
Noting that brs (ςi) = OP (khk2+kλk), it is straightforward to show thatDn22,rs1b = OP ((h!)−1/2
(khk2 + kλk)) = oP (1) . Noting that E (Dn22,rs1a) = 0 and E
¡
D2n22,rs1a
¢
= O(nh!(khk2 +
kλk)2) = o (1) , we have Dn22,rs1a = oP (1) by the Chebyshev inequality. Similarly, we can
show thatDn22,rs1b = oP (1) and thusDn22,rs1 = oP (1) . By the same token,Dn22,rs2 = oP (1) .
It follows that
Dn22 = oP (1) . (A.7)
By Lemma A.1 and Assumption A.5, we have Dn23 = n (h!)1/2OP (khk4) = OP (n khk4 (h!)1/2)
= oP (1) . This, in conjunction with (A.3), (A.6) and (A.7), implies thatDn2−Bn
d→ N
¡
0, σ20
¢
.
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Next, we show (iii). By Lemma A.1, under H1
¡
n−1/2(h!)−1/4
¢
we have
Dn3 =
cy−2X
r=0
cy−1X
s=r+1
n−1/2 (h!)1/4
nX
i=1
£
e01[Sr (Xi)]
−1Vnr (ςi)− e01[Ss (Xi)]−1Vns (ςi))
+ e01[Sr (Xi)]
−1Br (ςi)− e01[Ss (ζi)]−1Bs (ςi)
¤
δn,rs(ςi)
+ n1/2 (h!)1/4OP
³
ν2n + νn
³
khk2 + kλk
´´
≡
cy−2X
r=0
cy−1X
s=r+1
[Dn31,rs −Dn32,rs +Dn33,rs −Dn34,rs] + oP (1) ,
where, for example, Dn31,rs ≡ n−1/2 (h!)1/4
Pn
i=1 e
0
1[Sr (Xi)]
−1 Vnr (ςi) δn,rs(ς i), and Dn3l,rs,
l = 2, 3, 4, are analogously defined. Decompose
Dn31,rs = n−3/2 (h!)1/4
nX
i=1
nX
j 6=i
e01[Sr (Xi)]
−1τh
¡
Xcj −Xci
¢
Khλ (Xj ,Xi)1
r
j1Zi,r (ςj) δn,rs(ςi)
+n−3/2 (h!)1/4
nX
i=1
e01[Sr (Xi)]
−1τh (0)Khλ (Xi,Xi)1
r
i1Zi,r (ς i) δn,rs(ς i)
≡ Dn31,rs1 +Dn31,rs2, say.
It is easy to show that Dn31,rs2 = OP (n−1/2 (h!)
−3/4) = oP (1) by Assumption A.5. For
Dn31,rs1, noting that E [Dn31,rs1] = 0 and
E [Dn31,rs1]2
= n−3 (h!)1/2
nX
i=1
nX
i0=1
nX
j 6=i,i0
E
©
e01[Sr (Xi)]
−1τh
¡
Xcj −Xci
¢
Khλ (Xj ,Xi)1rj1Zi,r (ςj) δn,rs(ς i)
×e01[Sr (Xi0)]−1τh
¡
Xcj −Xci0
¢
Khλ (Xj ,Xi0)1Zi0 ,r (ςj) δn,rs(ς i0)
ª
+n−3 (h!)1/2
nX
i=1
nX
j 6=i
E
©
e01[Sr (Xi)]
−1τh
¡
Xcj −Xci
¢
Khλ (Xj ,Xi)1rj1Zi,r (ςj) δn,rs(ς i)
×e01[Sr (Xj)]−1τ h
¡
Xci −Xcj
¢
Khλ (Xi,Xj)1ri1Zj ,r (ς i) δn,rs(ςj)
ª
= O
³
(h!)1/2 + n−1 (h!)−1/2
´
= o (1) ,
we have Dn31,rs1 = oP (1) by the Chebyshev inequality. Hence Dn31,rs = oP (1) . Similarly
Dn32,rs = oP (1) . Noting that supς
¯¯
Br (ς)
¯¯
= O(khk2 + kλk), we have
Dn33,rs ≤ n1/2 (h!)1/4O
³
khk2 + kλk
´
n−1
nX
i=1
|δn,rs(ς i)| = OP
³
n1/2 khk2 (h!)1/4
´
= oP (1) .
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Similarly Dn34,rs = oP (1) . Consequently, Dn3 = oP (1) .
We now show (iv). Noting that a2 − b2 = (a− b)2 + 2 (a− b) b, we have bBn − Bn =Pcy−2
r=0
Pcy−1
s=r+1Bn1,rs +2
Pcy−2
r=0
Pcy−1
s=r+1Bn2,rs, where
Bn1,rs ≡
(h!)1/2
n2
nX
i=1
nX
j 6=i
{bαij,r − bαij,s}2 ,
Bn2,rs ≡
(h!)1/2
n2
nX
i=1
nX
j 6=i
[bαij,r − bαij,s][Kr ¡ζj ;Xi¢1Zi,r (ςj)−Ks ¡ζj ;Xi, ¢1Zi,s (ςj)],
and bαij,r = e01[Snr (Xi)]−1τh ³Xcj −Xci ´Khλ (Xj ,Xi)1rjb1Zi,r (ςj)−Kr ¡ζj ,Xi¢1Zi,r (ςj) . Not-
ing that [Snr (Xi)]−1 = [Sr (Xi)]−1+OP (νn) and b1z,r (ςj)−1z,r (ςj) = F (z|Xj , r)− bF (z|Xj , r) =
OP (νn+khk2+kλk) uniformly inXj and z, we have bαij,r = e01[Sr (Xi)]−1τh ³Xcj −Xci ´Khλ (Xj ,Xi)
×1rj{b1Zi,r (ςj)− 1Zi,r (ςj)}+OP (νn) . It follows that
|Bn1,rs| ≤ (h!)
1/2
(n− 1)2
nX
i=1
nX
j 6=i
°°τh ¡Xcj −Xci ¢Khλ (Xj ,Xi)°°2 ×OP µ³νn + khk2 + kλk´2¶
= OP
³
(h!)−1/2 (ν2n + khk4 + kλk2)
´
= oP (1) ,
and similarly |Bn2,rs| = OP
³
(h!)−1/2 (νn + khk2 + kλk)
´
= oP (1) under Assumption A.5.
Consequently, bBn −Bn = oP (1) .
For (v), noticing that
bβij,rs = 1n
nX
l=1
©
Kr (ζi,Xl)1Zl,r (ς i)−Ks (ζi,Xl)1Zl,s (ς i)
ª
×©Kr ¡ζj ,Xl¢1Zl,r (ςj)−Ks ¡ζj ,Xl¢1Zl,s (ςj)ª+ oP (1)
=
Z ©
Kr (ζi, x)1z,r (ςi)−Ks (ζi, x)1z,s (ςi)
ª {Kr ¡ζj , x¢1z,r (ςj)
−Ks
¡
ζj , x
¢
1z,s (ςj)}Fξ (dξ) + oP (1) ,
we have bσ2n = σ20 + op (1) by the law of large numbers for U-statistics. ¥
Proof of Theorems 4.3
Using the notation defined in the proof of Theorem 4.2, we again write n−1Dn = n−1 (h!)−1/2
(Dn1 + Dn2 + 2Dn3). Under H1, it is easy to show that n−1 (h!)−1/2Dn1 =
Pcy−2
r=0
Pcy−1
s=r+1
E[F (Zi|Xi, r) −F (Zi|Xi, s)]2 + oP (1) , n−1 (h!)−1/2Dn2 = OP (ν2n + khk4 + kλk2) = oP (1) ,
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and n−1 (h!)−1/2Dn3 = OP (νn+ khk2+ kλk) = oP (1) . On the other hand, n−1 (h!)−1/2 bBn =
OP
¡
n−1
¢
= oP (1) and bσ2n = σ20 + oP (1). It follows that n−1 (h!)−1/2 Tn = (n−1Dn −
n−1 (h!)−1/2 bBn)/qbσ2n P→Pcy−2r=0 Pcy−1s=r+1E[F (Zi|Xi, r) −F (Zi|Xi, s)]2/σ0, and the conclusion
follows. ¥
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